ethically of the first importance and put it beyond the reach of the moralist 

Bell's position reflects the ethical philosophy of British philosopher G. E. Moore, whose book Principia Ethica (1903) underlies Bell's view that works of art possess intrinsic value and thus constitute an indispensable human good. (Bell elaborates his position and his debt to Moore in a later chapter of Art, "Art and Ethics.") Art is therefore "beyond the reach of the moralist" in the sense that those who make moral recommendations are in no position to challenge the goodness of any genuine work of art, that is, any work the significant form of which has caused someone to have the aesthetic emotion.

Alex Scott summarizes Moore's core doctrine in this way:

Moore argues that if something is good in itself, it has an intrinsic value, existing absolutely by itself. If something is intrinsically good, it is good independently of anything else. If its goodness derives from its being a part of something else, then it cannot be defined as good in itself.

Moore says that there are two things which are generally regarded as good in themselves: 1) personal affection, and 2) the appreciation of beauty in art or nature. These two forms of good may be combined to form an even greater good.

Bell thinks that works of art are intrinsically good, that they cannot be judged good are bad in relation to any ulterior function that they may have. This explains his view that representation and expressive dimensions of art are simply irrelevant to their status as art. (See paragraph 12.) Only the non-artistic qualities (such as a message) can have good or bad consequences that demand moral evaluation. It also explains his view that the artist's intentions are irrelevant to our response. (See paragraph 7.) Unlike Moore, Bell clearly places appreciation of art on a different plane than appreciation of nature. (See paragraph 9.)

Bell's position that genuine art is above morals is similar to views expressed by Oscar Wilde. Both Wilde and Bell are rejecting the Victorian platitude that virtue depends on moral imagination, and works of art are also to be judged by reference to their effect on moral imagination. (For more information on the Victorian point of view, click here.)

These views are strongly opposed by David Hume, who contends that works of art are not off limits to moral evaluation.